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MYTHS AND REALITIES OF THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM:
REFRAMING THE RIGHT OF RETURN
Susan M. Akram∗
INTRODUCTION
This year, 2007, marks the fortieth anniversary of the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza. It is also the sixtieth anniversary of the expulsion of the
Palestinian people from their homeland when the Israeli state was declared. The
year continues the stalemate punctured by a long series of negotiation processes
from Madrid to the failed Oslo interim agreements; the most recent Roadmap
offered by the Quartet countries provides no hope for a just and durable peace in
the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the second ‘intifada’ [uprising] of 2000, the recent
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the construction of the massive separation Wall,
ongoing occupation, land confiscation, oppression and ethnic cleansing of the
Palestinian people are reminders of how urgent a just peace is for the people of the
region. While the political discourse focuses almost exclusively on the need to
combat ‘terrorism’ as the main cause of the intractability of the problem, the real
root causes are ignored or deliberately omitted from the discourse.
One of the root causes of the ongoing conflict is the Palestinian refugee
problem. The political power brokers in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation
processes, rather than address the refugee problem, have deliberately excluded it
from the framework of negotiations. It is precisely this exclusion and the urgency of
the issue that makes it important to clarify, and bring to the forefront, of public
discourse. The intractability of the refugee problem, however, is not simply due to
an absence of political attention, but also to ambiguous legal standards applicable to
the Palestinian case. Palestinians, who have been denied critical aspects of
international legal protection, comprise one of the largest and longest-standing
refugee, or ‘refugee-like’ populations in the world—an estimated two in five
refugees in the world are Palestinian.1 Palestinians as a nationally-identifiable
population are unique in that they comprise the largest global population of refugees,
internally displaced, and stateless persons.
As this essay will discuss, elements of the Palestinian refugee problem are
found in numerous mass refugee situations in Africa, Central America, Asia and
Europe. What remains unique about the Palestinian refugee problem is the
persistent and severe denial of international protection, the lack of access both to a
durable solution and to the mechanisms for implementing a durable solution—
minimum protection guarantees that are available over time to other refugee
∗
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populations. There are three ways in which Palestinians are measurably worse off
than other groups in protracted refugee situations: first, no state or recognized
entity is legally required to provide international protection; second, the lack of state
or international protection leaves Palestinians with no prospect for durable solution
to their plight; and third, there is no access to any enforcement mechanism to
implement their rights.2 Contributing to the denial of protection to Palestinian
refugees is a severe gap in understanding and implementing the key provisions of
law applicable to the Palestinian case.
This paper describes the main legal issues underlying the Palestinian
refugee question, examining and deconstructing several of the key arguments
surrounding the rights and principles involved in the refugee problem. These
arguments are broadly described, discussing the actual rights involved in more
detail, along with their implications for a just and durable solution to this core
aspect of the Middle East conflict.
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM,
AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO LEGAL RIGHTS
The origins of the Palestinian refugee problem can be traced to the
interests of powerful western states in the Middle East region during the inter-war
and post World War II periods; the efforts to address resettlement of large numbers
of Jewish and other refugees and displaced persons after the War; and the Zionist
program to create a ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine. Much has been written about
each of these contributing factors, but historians and social scientists disagree as to
the exact causes of the refugee exodus, and why it has persisted.3
Competing narratives about the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem
relate directly to the Israeli position that recognizing Palestinians as refugees
imputes a Palestinian ‘right’ to return that negates a Jewish right of return to Israel.
Intrinsically related to this position is the contention that the Partition Resolution
was an affirmation by the international community of the establishment of a Jewish
state, and that Israel has the right to maintain a state of exclusively Jewish character,
or Jewish majority.4 Implicit in all of these arguments is a perception that
recognizing Palestinian refugees with a concomitant right of return threatens the
existence of Israel as a Jewish state.
The conflict’s roots are traceable to the birth of the Zionist movement,
from which emerged the program to create a ‘Jewish national home’ in Palestine.
The Zionists succeeded in obtaining approval of the Balfour Declaration by the
British government, proclaiming that the British government “viewed with favour
the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”5
The inconsistent British commitments of, on the one hand, administering
Palestine under the post-War League of Nations Mandate for the benefit of its
native population and, on the other hand, carrying out the Balfour Declaration
commitment to establishing a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ spelled disaster
in Palestine.6 These policies laid the foundation for competing claims between the
immigrating Jewish community and the native Palestinian population, and fighting
broke out between 1922-1948. The Zionist plan was further given purported
legitimacy by the passage of the UN General Assembly Partition Resolution, 181 on
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November 29, 1947 following Britain’s unilateral declaration that it would quit its
Mandate.7 Facing strenuous opposition by the Arab states and Palestinian
leadership, 181 recommended the partition of historic Palestine into two states, one
‘Arab’ and one ‘Jewish’. The Resolution passed 30-17, with 9 abstentions.8
The Resolution was a nonbinding recommendation by the General
Assembly for a political solution to the British Mandate’s termination, the massive
outbreak of violence, and the seemingly irreconcilable claims of the communities in
Palestine.9 The Resolution recommended the establishment of two states, Arab and
Jewish, with economic union between them. The ‘Jewish’ state was to be
established in 56% of historic Palestine, benefiting the less than 1/3 of the
population which was Jewish that owned no more than 7% of the land; the ‘Arab’
state was to be established in 44% of Palestine, representing the 95% of the native
Palestinian population which owned 93% of the land.10
Aside from whether the General Assembly had legal authority to
recommend partition, let alone confer title to territory held by people unwilling to
relinquish their land, 181 did not authorize establishment of an exclusive Jewish state.
The Jewish area was to have 498,000 Jews and 407,700 Arabs, and the Arab area
was to have 10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs. Jerusalem was to be an ‘international
zone,’ with 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.11 Thus, even the Jewish area would
have a bare Jewish majority. Among the most important provisions of 181 are those
on non-discrimination, which prohibited each state from discriminating on the basis
of race, religion or national origin.12 Neither did 181 authorize transfer of
populations from one area to another, although provision was made to protect
those who chose to move.13 Hence, the General Assembly through Resolution 181
gave no authority for an exclusive Jewish state, as such an action would be in
fundamental violation of the UN Charter.
The organized Jewish community proclaimed the Israeli state on May 15,
1948.14 Following the passage of Resolution 181, and even before the Israeli state
was declared, Jewish militias began expelling the non-Jewish population from its
self-declared territory, continuing to expand into what was to constitute the Arab
state. Months before the declaration of formal hostilities between Israel and the
Arab states, armed and well-organized Jewish militias forced one-half of the
Palestinian Arab population out of their towns, cities and villages. During the
following war, the Zionist militias displaced the disorganized and primarily unarmed
Palestinian population in large numbers, using a combination of tactics including
armed attacks, massacres, looting, destruction of property, and forced expulsion.15
The majority of the refugees fled in 1948 under ‘Plan Dalet,’ the Zionist
military plan to expel as many Palestinian Arabs as possible under the guise of
necessity of war.16 One of the earliest documented massacres was in the village of
Deir Yassin of April 1948, in which 250 Palestinian men, women and children were
killed. Other massacres followed, including nine in October 1948 alone, in which
hundreds of Palestinians villagers were killed and thrown in mass graves.17 The
massacres terrorized the Palestinian population, and as more refugees fled or were
expelled, Israeli forces systematically destroyed hundreds of villages. Israeli military
forces carried out ‘shoot to kill’ policies to prevent refugees from returning. The
Israeli government continued its expulsion policies, both within the cease-fire lines
and outside, following the Armistice Agreements of 1949.18
Immediately following declaration of the state, Israel adopted measures to
prevent return, which were incorporated in a plan called “Retroactive Transfer, A
Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel.”19 Among the
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implemented measures were destruction of Palestinian Arab population centers,
settlement of Jews in Arab towns and villages, and passage of legislation to prevent
refugee return.
Israel also passed a series of laws defining Palestinians who were forcibly
removed from their lands or fled as ‘absentees,’ defining their lands as ‘absentee
properties’ and then confiscating them.20 Subsequent Israeli legislation converted
vast amounts of confiscated properties for the exclusive benefit of Jews, and
prohibited restitution of such land to Palestinian Arabs in perpetuity. These
measures also extended to Palestinians who remained on their land and became
Israeli citizens, depriving them of their properties through the legal fiction that they
were ‘present absentees,’ and thus subject to the expropriation laws.21
Israel also enacted discriminatory nationality legislation. Prior to the
creation of the Israeli state, Palestinians were nationals and citizens of the area
known as Palestine under British Mandate, a status legally formalized by Mandate
law. Israel’s Nationality Law of 1952 retroactively repealed Palestinian citizenship as
recognized under the Mandate, and automatically granted every Jewish immigrant
Israeli nationality, but placed such stringent conditions on the eligibility of
Palestinian Arabs for Israeli nationality that few could qualify.22
Through its laws of nationality, citizenship and land regulation, Israel denationalized the majority of Palestinian Arabs from their homeland, permanently
expropriated Arab lands, homes and collective properties, creating an entire
population of stateless refugees. The intent and effect of these laws was
institutionalized preferencing of one group on the basis of ethnicity (‘Jewish
nationality’) over another (Arab Palestinians), and legalizing discrimination against
the latter.23 This institutionalized discrimination significantly affected both the
creation and maintenance of the Palestinian refugee problem.
Calculations differ as to how many Palestinians became refugees or
internally displaced during the 1948-49 conflict, but the best estimates arrive at
between 750,000-800,000 refugees, or about 85% of the Palestinian population
from what became the state of Israel.24 Today, there are three primary groups of
Palestinian refugees. The largest group is Palestinians displaced from their places of
origin due to armed conflict and the 1948 war, including refugees who are eligible
for assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) and those who were also displaced in 1948 but were either
ineligible for UNRWA assistance or did not register with the agency. The second
group of refugees—usually termed ‘displaced persons’—comprises those displaced
for the first time from their homes in the territories Israel occupied after the 1967
conflict. The third group includes those who were neither refugees from the 1948
nor the 1967 conflict, but who are outside of Palestine and are being denied the
right to return due to Israel’s discriminatory residency, expulsion, and deportation
laws.25
There are two additional groups of Palestinians in ‘refugee-like’ condition.
The first group comprises those who remained in the ‘recognized borders’ of Israel,
who were expelled or forced to flee from their homes during the 1948 conflict or
were transferred out of their home areas or otherwise displaced due to
expropriation or demolition of their homes. The second group comprises persons
who suffered similar Israeli actions within the 1967 occupied territories.
Although the historical record is overwhelming that Palestinian refugees
were forcibly expelled as part of a systematic plan to make room for Jews, the
opposite contention that they left on their own has no relevance to their main legal
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rights as refugees: the right to return, the right to property restitution, and the right
to compensation for real or personal property loss.
THE DEFINITION AND STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The most important questions human rights and refugee law principles
address are whether Palestinians are refugees or stateless persons under the
international legal definition of those terms, and if so, what rights states must
implement as a consequence of that status; whether they have a right to return to
their places of origin, to restitution of property or compensation for losses; and
what obligations states have to implement these or other rights in the search for a
durable solution.
A. The Problem of Defining a Palestinian Refugee
According to the most recent Survey on Palestinian Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons, compiled by Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights, the global population of 9.7 million Palestinians includes some
seven million persons who are refugees or internally displaced. The refugee figure
includes 6.8 million of the original 1948 refugee population, of which 4.3 million
are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA) for assistance; 834,000 refugees from the 1967 conflict; another 345,000
of the 1948 population internally displaced within Israel proper; and another 57,000
internally displaced within the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories.26
Approximately 1.3 million Palestinian refugees are residents of 59 official
refugee camps scattered throughout the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and
Syria, established and run by UNRWA. 27 The majority of residents are 1948
refugees and their descendants, while the rest are 1967 refugees and their
descendants. UNRWA also operates another 17 ‘unofficial’ camps to house
Palestinian refugees who can no longer be accommodated in the existing official
camp locations.28
These categories and figures are challenged by Israeli/Zionist historical and
legal narratives, which frequently deny the existence of Palestinian refugees in
various formulations: that they abandoned their homes and are not nationals of the
state of Israel; that they found refuge in nearby states which are obliged to resettle
them; that they have either de facto or de jure become nationals, citizens or permanent
residents of the new states in which they reside, thus no longer having a refugee
claim even if they once did; and that they are not ‘refugees’ in any legal sense..29
The status of Palestinians as refugees is complicated because there are
multiple definitions of ‘Palestinian refugee.’ The earliest UN discussion on record
of how to define Palestinian refugees appears during the drafting of the General
Assembly’s Resolution 194, which was passed on 11 December, 1948. Under
Resolution 194, the General Assembly established the United Nations Conciliation
Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) with a broad mandate to resolve both the
conflict and the massive refugee problem; described the refugees for whom the
UNCCP would provide ‘international protection;’ and in 194(III) paragraph 11, set
out the required legal formula for resolving the refugee problem.30
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Although the language of Resolution 194 incorporates no clear definition
of ‘Palestinian refugee,’ the UNCCP’s authoritative Analysis of paragraph 11 of the
General Assembly’s Resolution of 11 December 1948, states that:
[T]he term “refugees” applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews
and others who have been displaced from their homes in Palestine.
This would include Arabs in Israel who have been shifted from their
normal places of residence. It would also include Jews who had their
homes in Arab Palestine, such as the inhabitants of the Jewish
quarter of the Old City. It would not include Arabs who have lost
their lands but not their houses, such as the inhabitants of
Tulkarm.31
This definition was accepted by the drafters of Resolution 194 to define the
entire group of Palestinians entitled to the protection of the international
community.32
As will be discussed below, this definition differs from the universallyadopted definition of ‘refugee’ appearing in the important international instruments,
but is consistent with the general legal understanding that a refugee is an individual
meeting certain criteria and lacking protection of his/her state of nationality or
origin. It is the lack of protection that places the burden on the international
community to provide ‘international protection’ for refugees.33 This concept also
underlies international protection of persons who are not recognized nationals of
any state as a matter of either law or fact (stateless persons), and persons who are
internally displaced when the state of origin or nationality fails to provide
protection.34 By including the internally displaced Palestinians who had lost their
homes and lands but remained in Israel in this definition, the UN drafters
recognized that such individuals, like the ‘refugees,’ were not receiving the
protection of the Israeli state.
The definition of ‘Palestine refugee’ for purposes of international
protection and UNCCP’s mandate differs from the definition used by UNRWA,
the agency providing need-based assistance to refugees. UNRWA coverage extends
to registered Palestine refugees residing in its areas of operation in the occupied
Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic only.35
UNRWA defines ‘Palestine refugee’ as any person whose “normal place of
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost
both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.”36 Palestine
refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance are mainly persons who fulfill the above
definition, and descendants of fathers fulfilling the definition.37 This definition of
refugee is restricted to those eligible to receive aid, as it explicitly states that the
refugee must have lost both home and means of livelihood to be eligible for
registration. In contrast to UNRWA’s needs-based definition, the term “Palestine
refugee” in Resolution 194(III)--defining those eligible for refugee repatriation and
compensation--has a quite different, and far less restrictive meaning.
The third relevant definition is incorporated in two provisions of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention); Articles
1A(2) and 1D. The Article 1A(2) definition, which is referred to as the ‘universal’
definition of refugee due to almost-universal adoption by states, has been widely
misunderstood in reference to Palestinians, and in relation to Article 1D’s reference
to Palestinians as a category of refugees. This ambiguity is used to support the
position that Palestinians are not ‘refugees’ in the universal sense of that term.
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Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention incorporates an
individualized definition of refugee prohibiting state parties from returning or
sending any individual to a state where the refugee risks persecution for reasons of
race, religion, political opinion, nationality or social group.38 Article 1D of the
Convention has very different definitional criteria, and, without mentioning any
particular group, was meant to apply exclusively to Palestinian refugees. Article 1D
states that the Refugee Convention “shall not apply to persons who are at present
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] protection or assistance.” Its
second sentence states: “when such protection or assistance has ceased for any
reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance
with [relevant UN resolutions] these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the
benefits of this Convention.”39 Article 1D’s two clauses have been subjected to
widely divergent interpretations, with the general result that Palestinians are denied
most of the minimum protection guarantees of the Refugee Convention. The most
widely-held interpretation is that 1D is an exclusion clause, preventing Palestinians
from being recognized as refugees since UNRWA is assumed to be providing them
with international protection.40
Two other provisions apply to Palestinians as subjects of international law:
Article 1 of the Stateless Persons Convention, and Paragraph 7(c) of the UNCHR
Statute.41 Both incorporate language similar to the first sentence of Article 1D,
thereby precluding extension of UNHCR’s mandate towards Palestinians as
refugees, and application of the benefits of the Stateless Persons Convention. This
interpretation has had severe consequences for Palestinians seeking benefits as
refugees, stateless and displaced persons worldwide. Palestinians have been
precluded from many critical aspects of international protection, both in the day-today exercise of their human and civil rights, and in their longer-term desire for
protection, intervention, and mechanisms for obtaining a durable solution to their
condition.
B. The Palestinian ‘Protection Gap’ and its Consequences
Lack of a recognized legal status integrally relates to the deplorable physical
and human conditions faced by the majority of Palestinian refugees.. Although
conditions on identifiable criteria vary significantly country by country, Palestinians
worldwide are measurably worse off on the whole compared to their fellow nonPalestinian refugees or stateless persons.42 Conceptually and legally, conditions of
Palestinian refugees can be viewed in terms of their day-to-day physical security and
human needs and their prospects for realizing and implementing durable solutions
to end their stateless status. These two aspects also vary in two global regions: in
the Arab states, where the majority of Palestinian refugees are located, and in the
non-Arab world.
Physical security, human dignity and basic needs of Palestinian refugees
within the Arab world vary dramatically. In the Arab regions where UNRWA
operates, registered refugees obtain benefits for basic survival needs. UNRWA
administers housing, allots food and clothing rations, establishes and runs primary
schools, and operates medical facilities within its mandate.43 Other rights and
benefits outside UNRWA’s mandate and within the realm of ‘international
protection’ are left to the discretion of the host state, as neither UNHCR nor any
other international agency has authority to provide such protection to Palestinians
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within the Arab world. Thus, no state or agency has the authority to intervene to
protect the refugees’ physical security, or to guarantee (or prevent violations of)
their core human rights.
Particularly in the Arab world, Palestinian refugees are extremely
vulnerable. Most states in the Arab League are not signatories to international
instruments guaranteeing the rights of refugees and stateless persons. The most
relevant document is the 1965 Casablanca Protocol of the League of Arab States,
which requires Arab state signatories to guarantee to Palestinians in their territories
the same treatment in employment, freedom of movement between Arab states,
granting and renewing travel documents, freedom of residence, and rights to leave
and return as they give their own nationals. Compared to provisions of international
instruments, like the Refugee Convention, the Casablanca Protocol provides more
guarantees in a number of ways.44 Nevertheless, the degree to which Arab states
comply with these obligations depends primarily on the political environment
affecting Palestinians in their territories, rather than on compliance with treaty
standards. Generally most Palestinians in Arab states are treated like foreigners, in
that they are denied permanent residence status or any security of residence, even if
they marry female citizens of the country or have children born in that Arab state.
Movement between Arab states is extremely restricted because of lack of travel and
residency documents. Employment is restricted in many states, as is housing, access
to education beyond primary school, and family reunification. Using these criteria,
Palestinians in Lebanon suffer the worst conditions--restricted to overcrowded,
substandard, unsanitary, and often dangerous refugee camps. They are denied the
right to work in over 60 professions as well as the rights to quality education and
family reunification. Palestinians in Syria, on the other hand, enjoy quite favorable
conditions in terms of day-to-day rights. Although they are not eligible for Syrian
citizenship, they receive most of the same residency, social, education, employment
and civil rights as Syrian citizens.45
The lack of basic rights has had devastating consequences for
refugee/stateless populations. Without security of residence, Palestinians are
subjected to repeated expulsion and dispossession. Aside from the expulsions from
historic Palestine/Israel and the occupied territories, almost every decade since
1948 has brought mass expulsion of Palestinians from one Arab state or another.
Palestinian refugee families have suffered multiple displacements within the Arab
world due to lack of access to a nationality or citizenship. 46
In the non-Arab world, where over 500,000 Palestinian refugees reside,
their physical and human condition directly relates to the host state’s interpretation
of the relevant provisions of refugee and stateless persons instruments. UNHCR
has recently formalized its position that in the non-Arab world it may exercise its
protection mandate towards Palestinians, depending on the attitude of the host
state.47 Most states in the Western world are either signatories of the Refugee
Convention, one of the two Stateless Persons conventions, or some combination of
these instruments. Nevertheless, most states do not apply Article 1D at all,
misinterpret it as an exclusion clause, or apply the individualized refugee definition
of Article 1A(2).48 The result is that Palestinians are unrecognized, either as refugees
or stateless persons, in most of the Western world, where they are also vulnerable
to multiple displacements due to their ‘nonreturnability.’ In many cases,
Palestinians are subjected to prolonged detention because there is no state of
nationality or habitual residence to which they can be returned. Nor do states
provide them residence in fulfillment of obligations to reduce statelessness. States
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frequently identify Palestinians as being of ‘unknown origin,’ or ‘unclear nationality,’
rather than identifying them as stateless or Palestinian refugees in order to preclude
the application of the stateless and refugee conventions.49
The legal ‘protection gap’ for Palestinians is most acute in terms of
implementing durable solutions. Since Palestinians are considered excluded from
the provisions of the major refugee instruments, they are excepted from the norms
and mechanisms by which other refugees can realize the right of return and other
rights. In contrast to UNHCR’s role as the primary agency working to implement
these rights for other refugees and stateless persons, it does not, for the most part,
exercise this role for Palestinian rights. Most important, UNHCR does not
intervene with the state primarily responsible for causing Palestinians to be refugees
and stateless persons—Israel—in seeking implementation of their right of return,
the solution preferred by the refugees and the international community in general.
UNRWA, having no protection mandate, is excluded from such a role with the
effect that the key international mechanisms for implementing refugee return and
related rights are unavailable to Palestinians.50
THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES,
AND STATE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THEM
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
What refugee rights Palestinians have under international law relates to
whether they are considered refugees as a legal matter,--a more complex question
than for other refugees. The international legal definition of refugee is, at its core, a
determination about who is unable or unwilling to obtain national protection, and
deserves the protection of the international community. Under the main
international provisions defining refugees and others ‘deserving of international
protection,’ Palestinians clearly qualify.
Recent research into the drafting history of the interrelated provisions in
the Refugee and Stateless Persons Conventions and the Statute of the UNHCR
reveals that interpreting these provisions to exclude Palestinians is incorrect.
According to the travaux preparatoires, the UN delegates drafting these provisions
reached an overwhelming consensus that Palestinian refugees deserved (and
required) both protection and assistance for several critical reasons, namely: their
large-scale persecution and expulsion as a people; the UN’s complicity in creating
the refugee problem; and the consensus already embodied in UN Resolutions that
the durable solution for Palestinians was repatriation and not resettlement.51
The purpose of these provisions was to establish a separate regime
specifically to protect Palestinian refugees—manifested in the creation of two UN
agencies: the UNCCP and UNRWA—and not to dilute UN’s responsibility towards
them. This is why they were not initially included in the resettlement-focused
Refugee Convention/UNHCR regime. Article 1D was intended as a contingent
inclusion clause that would automatically bring all Palestinian refugees under the
coverage of the Refugee Convention should either prong of the special regime
fail.52
Because the majority of Palestinians are considered outside the
Convention’s refugee definition , and are specifically excluded from UNHCR’s
mandate by its Statute, they are presumed not to be ‘refugees’ for purposes of
eligibility for international protection. But the drafting history of the instruments
and the mandates of the agencies relevant to the Palestinians reflect that

192
international protection was of utmost concern to the UN. Of the two entities
established by the UN with responsibilities for the Palestinians, the UNCCP and
UNRWA, the former clearly had the UN’s attention in its efforts to resolve both
the refugee problem and the wider Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict. The UNCCP
had an indefinite mandate, while UNRWA was initially established for only three
years.53 The reasons behind UNCCP’s diminished role as the instrument of
international protection are not entirely clear, but by 1952, the UNCCP had been
reduced to no more than a small office to maintain records of Palestinian refugee
property holdings. A partial explanation is that when the UNCCP was unable to
implement any aspect of the durable solution required by Resolution 194 the UN
determined that UNCCP was no longer able to fulfill its mandate and decimated
the agency through a series of budget reductions. Although UNRWA’s valuable
services have provided subsistence needs for Palestinian refugees for five decades, it
is legally constrained from providing the main international protection guarantees
to the refugees that could bring their plight closer to a permanent resolution. 54
Related to the contention that Palestinians are not refugees is the position
that they have no legal right to ‘return’ to Israel that Israel is obligated to respect.
Opponents of a Palestinian right to return argue that Palestinians were displaced
during a defensive war, that Israel has no obligation to allow them to return since
they left voluntarily, that neither international human rights or humanitarian law
incorporates a right of return for war refugees, and that even if there were such a
right, it applies only to the return of individuals and not to mass return. Opponents
also argue that Israel as a successor state had the right to define its ‘nationals’ to
include or exclude any groups it chose and since Palestinians became ‘nonnationals’ under Israeli law, they had no right to return. Opponents further claim
that key UN resolutions such as Resolution 194 are nonbinding, that they do not, in
fact, create a right of return, and that even if they did, they condition it on certain
factors which have not been met.55 Each of the above positions negating a
Palestinian right of return has been countered with significant legal authority,
analysis, and state practice. Only the key points of these arguments can be
summarized here.
First, under humanitarian law, there is no distinction between forcible or
non-forcible displacement in guaranteeing war refugees the right of to return after
displacement. Critical humanitarian law provisions, such as Article 49 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, forbid the
forcible transfers of individuals or groups of people from territories taken during
war, and as requiring their repatriation ‘back to their homes’ as soon as hostilities
have ceased, and as necessitating the restoration of their area to the normal
community life existing before the outbreak of conflict. These underlying principles
are widely considered binding customary humanitarian law.56
Second, human rights provisions underlying the right of refugees or
displaced persons to return to their places of origin are found in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Art. 12). Other provisions are repeated in many other
international and regional human rights instruments. Although there is some
contention about whether these provisions oblige a state party to implement return
of a non-national of that state, the universal instruments—UDHR and ICCPR—
grant a returnee the right to return to his/her precise place of origin regardless of
current nationality or citizenship status by deliberately using the term ‘right to
return to his own country.’ instead of ‘to the country of his nationality.’ Moreover,
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these instruments make no distinction between individual or mass return, and the
drafting history of their provisions does not indicate that the drafters intended the
provisions to apply only to individuals.57
Third, such a reading accords with requirements of the law of state
succession, a core principle of which is that ‘the population follows the change of
sovereignty in matters of nationality;’ thus, the new state must grant nationality to
all original inhabitants. Although a state has almost unfettered discretion in defining
its citizens and nationals, it cannot violate certain recognized principles of
international law, such as by arbitrarily excluding the original inhabitants of the
territory it acquires, or defining its citizens/nationals on a discriminatory basis. The
principle of non-discrimination is fundamental, found throughout human rights
law.58 Israel is a party to all the universal rights instruments referenced here, and the
Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the 1907 Hague Regulations are binding on
Israel. Moreover, Israel has made no reservations limiting the application of these
Thus, Israel’s massive
instruments on the Palestinian right of return.59
denationalization of Palestinian Arabs on the basis of their national/ethnic origin
was prohibited under these principles from the outset, and constitutes a continuing
violation of their rights.
Fourth, there are hundreds of both UN General Assembly and Security
Council Resolutions dating back more than fifty years affirming and re-affirming
the right of return for refugees to their homes worldwide.60 In every part of the globe,
the right of refugees to return to their homes and lands of origin is incorporated in
peace treaties and recognized by all states. In fact, the right of return is one of the
most, if not the most, widely-implemented and recognized right in refugee law.
From state and international practice alone, it is evident that under international law
refugee return is the rule, and non-recognition of Palestinian refugees’ right to
return is an aberration.61
The language of Resolution 194, the earliest resolution insisting on
Palestinian refugee return, must be understood in light of the state of international
law existing at the time, and clarifications made by the UN drafters. The Resolution
embodies a three-pronged solution in hierarchical order: return, restitution of
properties, and compensation. Paragraph 11 of that Resolution states that:
“The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the
earliest practicable date, and…compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to
property which, under the principles of international law or in
equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities
responsible…[The UN] instructs the Conciliation Commission to
facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation…”
That this language meant the Palestinian refugees must be permitted to
return if they so chose is made clear both in the intentions of the drafters, as well as in
the discussions by the UN delegates when 194 was passed. Paragraph 11 also makes
return, restitution, and compensation equally enforceable, according to the refugee’s
own choice.62
This reading of 194 is the most consistent with refugee law principles as
recognized and implemented by states and international organs. UNHCR
implements three forms of durable solution for refugees: return to place of origin,
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host country absorption and third-state resettlement. While return is the preferred
solution for the overwhelming majority of refugees, UNHCR’s implementation of
any durable solution is driven by the principle of refugee choice. International burdensharing for refugees is meant to create meaningful and reasonable choice for
refugees among safe and voluntary return, absorption, and resettlement--to the
extent the latter two options are available in any particular refugee crisis. At the
same time, only return is an absolute obligation on states, since no state is required
to absorb or resettle a refugee--despite the Refugee Convention’s encouragement to
do so. In most instances of mass refugee flows since the 1970’s, all three options
have been available to some degree, and resolutions of mass refugee flows have
been most successful when all three were meaningful choices for the refugees
themselves. All of these principles have strengthened since 1948 when Resolution
194 was passed, in that implementation and codification of return, restitution and
compensation have become more widespread. Until recently, the General Assembly
also reaffirmed Resolution 194 annually.63
THE RELEVANCE OF A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
The international community created the ‘protection gap’ that leaves
Palestinians outside the well-recognized framework of human rights applying to
other refugees and displaced persons. Lack of clear application of rights standards
to Palestinians applies also to the right of return; hence, the position that there is no
right of return for Palestinians seems perfectly consistent with the exceptionalist
discourse vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees.
Separating political positions from substantive legal rights helps clarify the
absurdity of the exceptionalist discourse as a legal matter, and challenges the notion
that widely-recognized rights are not also guaranteed to Palestinians. Legal
arguments challenging the right of return present a strange dichotomy: on the one
hand, such arguments do not challenge the right of return per se, but challenge it as
it applies to the Palestinian case; on the other hand, they maintain that there is no
Palestinian right of return while insisting on a Jewish ‘right of return’ as the basis
for Jewish nationality in Israel. Aside from the question of whether Jews possess a
distinct ‘nationality,’ it is extremely difficult to argue that Jews possess a right to
‘return’ to Palestine after some 2,000 years while Palestinians cannot exercise such a
right after approximately 60 years. Thus, the debate about the source of a
Palestinian right of return focuses more on how a Palestinian right of return could
be realized without jeopardizing the ‘Jewish state’ than on whether a right of return
for Palestinian refugees exists as a matter of law. This leads to the question of
whether there is an internationally recognized ‘right’ to a Jewish state, and the
deconstruction of that concept into underlying legal terms.64
Understanding how and why the Palestinian refugee problem was created,
the response of the UN and the international community to the problem, and how
that was incorporated into rights instruments applicable to Palestinians is critical to
insisting upon the selfsame rights standards for Palestinians as all others in
protracted refugee situations. Even though it should be clear that Palestinians are
entitled to the same rights as others in refugee and refugee-like situations, the
instruments and agencies created to apply those rights to them have failed to
guarantee them. Where, then, does this leave those concerned with a just solution
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to the Palestinian problem and the wider Middle East conflict, in light of the lack of
political will to bring it about?
Civil society has a great role to play in redressing the legal and political
lacunae applicable to Palestinians: lobbying and other civil initiatives directed at
many global players and in the UN must focus on specific demands. A range of
strategies have been discussed by commentators and academics, including reviving
the broad protection role of the long-defunct UNCCP, or incorporating a specific
protection mandate to the assistance role of UNRWA. Specific strategies to
ameliorate the Palestinian protection gap have also been proposed, such as the use
of boycotts, divestment and sanctions to put pressure on Israel to change its
policies and the call for UN intervention through protection forces on the ground.
Since these options have been discussed at length elsewhere, only a few
points need be made here. First, any change in specific language or mandate of
international instruments or agencies such as UNRWA, UNCCP or UNHCR, will
require a UN General Assembly Resolution, the merits of which remain to be
debated. Second, because of the complexity of the underlying issues, a great deal of
education remains to be done to pursue any of the options—a task which itself
faces formidable barriers from the Zionist lobbies and their sympathizers. Third,
although there have been some promising international campaigns, such as the
‘Boycott/Divestment/Sanctions (BDS)’ campaign, a truly global civil society
campaign for reasserting a framework of international legal rights on behalf of
Palestinians has yet to be implemented. Perhaps rather than simply commemorate
the ‘anniversaries’ of Palestinian disasters, 2007 may be the year in which such a
global campaign for renewed commitment to implementing Palestinian rights
becomes reality.
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